ABSTRACT An aggregate signature turns multi-message multi-authentication into multi-message singleauthentication, reducing the required storage space, transmission cost, and number of verification calculations, and is suitable for fast message authentication in the big data era, particularly in wireless sensor networks and secure email systems. Many aggregate signature schemes have been proposed, including lattice-based ones, which have good resistance to quantum machine attacks. However, the existing latticebased aggregate signature schemes, which either have strict requirements on the signing order or encounter security risks, are not suitable for the unordered polymerization environment. In this paper, we accordingly propose a lattice-based unordered aggregate signature scheme. The proposed scheme makes use of the intersection method and solves the unordered aggregate problem of lattice signatures with different public keys. Therefore, it avoids both the signing order limitation and the risk of single signature forgery. Furthermore, the scheme follows the improved security model; hence, it is robust against collusion attacks. In addition, the scheme's security depends on the small integer solution problem, which enables the scheme to resist quantum algorithm attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
An aggregate signature, firstly presented by Boneh et al. [1] in 2003, combines many signatures associated with different messages into one signature, providing authentication for multiple message-signature pairs corresponding to multiple users in one step. It reduces the required signature storage space, network bandwidth requirements for transmission, and number of signature verification computations. The aggregate signature technology is not only a signature compression technology but also a signature batch processing technology, which meets the demand for high-speed data authentication in the current big data era, especially in applications such as Internet of Things, cloud computing and distributed systems.
Consequently, many studies on aggregate signatures have been carried out one after another. In 2004, Lysyanskaya et al. [2] defined the concept of the sequential aggregate signature and constructed a sequential aggregate signature based on the trapdoor permutation. In 2005, Shao [3] proposed a new security model and presented an improved aggregate signature scheme. In 2006, Lu et al. [4] designed the first provably secure aggregate signature scheme in the standard model with the technique of Waters [5] . In 2013, Lee et al. [6] presented a sequential aggregate signature in the standard model. In 2016, Shen et al. [7] introduced the security of the aggregate algorithm and offered an aggregate signature scheme provably secure against collusion attacks.
The current research results show that the unordered aggregate signature and the sequential aggregate signature are two branches of the aggregate signature. The former is suitable for scenarios where the aggregation of signatures does not have a sequential requirement, such as wireless sensor networks and secure email systems; the latter is applied to scenarios where the aggregation of signatures has a strict order requirement, such as the secure routing protocol and PKI certificate chain. However, constructions of the above aggregate signature schemes are all based on bilinear pairings or the RSA problem, the security of which relies on the difficulty FIGURE 1. Analysis of Zhang's aggregate signature scheme [11] . FIGURE 2. Analysis of Jing's aggregate signature scheme [12] .
in solving the discrete logarithm problem or factorization problem of large integers. According to Shor's results [8] , the above schemes are unable to resist attacks from quantum computers. Therefore, we must design aggregate signature schemes under cryptographic systems that are robust against quantum computer attacks, such as the lattice-based cryptographic system, which has a concise algebraic structure, involves parallel linear computations and possesses stronger security.
Fortunately, some sequential aggregate signature schemes exist that have been proven to be secure based on a lattice; however, none of the unordered ones are secure. In 2014, El Bansarkhani and Buchmann [9] designed a lattice-based sequential aggregate signature scheme. Subsequently, Yanhua et al. [10] designed a lattice-based sequential aggregate signature with lazy verification in 2015. For these two schemes, a strict order must exist among individual signatures that need to be aggregated. Under certain circumstances, such as in healthcare wireless sensor networks, no order exists among individual signatures, and the sequential aggregate signature appears bulky and inflexible. Therefore, the lattice-based unordered aggregate signature is indispensable. In 2012, Zhang et al. [11] introduced a homomorphic technique and presented an unordered aggregate signature scheme based on a lattice. In this scheme, all signers have the same public key, and their individual secret keys are all the short bases of the same lattice, resulting in the following: the i-th signer can sign message ω j with the j-th signer knowing nothing about it. In 2014, Jing [12] also presented an unordered homomorphic aggregate signature scheme based on a lattice. His scheme assigns different users with different public/secret key pairs, with all single signatures still coming from the same lattice, which is determined by all users. They can find the common lattice's short basis through their respective secret keys, and the common lattice's short basis is the actual signing secret key; thus, the scheme has the same effect as that of Zhang et al. [11] . Although these two schemes use different construction methods, they have the same problem: every signer of the single signature has the ability to sign messages on behalf of other signers, which violates the authentication rights of other users. An intuitive description of the problem is given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 , with the key point being the following: to realize the aggregation of single signatures, all users' public keys must have a certain relationship, resulting in their private keys having the same function.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
To achieve unordered aggregation of single lattice signatures and avoid forgery, inspired by the intersection method creatively put forward by Boneh and Freeman [13] in Eurocrypt 2011, we design a new correspondence between single signatures and an aggregate signature. More specifically, let ⊥ q (A a ) be an integer lattice, the short basis of which (T a ) is public. Then, we set t lattices { 1 , 2 , · · · , t } such that their sum is full of integers and their intersection is ⊥ q (A a ).
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Based on the intersection method, setting single signature e i as the co-set representative of lattice i , we establish a one-to-one correspondence between all single signatures {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e t } and a vector e. With the help of the Gaussian sampling algorithm presented in [14] , we make e short enough to be a lattice signature. Finally, e is set as the aggregate signature of single signatures {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e t }. In our construction, the aggregate signature is an individual short vector, and none of the users has the ability to sign messages for the other users because all users have separate public/private keys. In addition, following the security model in [7] , we consider the security of aggregation algorithm and prove that our scheme is secure even if all but one of the single signers are malicious, hence being resistant to collusion attacks.
B. PAPER OUTLINE
This paper is organized as follows. The necessary preliminaries are reviewed in section 2. The system model of the aggregate signature scheme is proposed in section 3. Our new scheme is presented in section 4 and analyzed in section 5.
Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly present the necessary definitions and results. If you are interested in further details, please refer to [13] - [17] . Let x represent the smallest integer larger than or equal to x. Bold letters in lower case, such as v, denote vectors. v is the length of vector v in the Euclidean norm. Bold letters in upper case, such as A, denote matrices. A is the Schmidt orthogonal matrix of A. A , known as the norm of matrix A, is the maximum length of all column vectors a i in matrix A, namely, max i a i .
For complexity, (f (n)) is asymptotically cf (n) for some constant c, O(f (n)) is any function that does not grow faster than (f (n)), and ω(f (n)) is any function that grows faster than (f (n)). Finally, we give the security foundation of our aggregate signature scheme-the small integer solution (SIS) problem. If readers are interested in further details, please see [14] .
Definition 10: The SIS problem is defined as follows: given an integer q, a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , and a real β, find an integer vector e ∈ Z m , e = 0 such that Ae = 0 mod q and e ≤ β.
According to [14] , the SIS problem is a hard problem and can be used to construct a secure signature scheme in a lattice.
III. SYSTEM MODEL OF AGGREGATE SIGNATURE A. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION
Based on Boneh et al. [1] and Shen et al. [7] , we make use of six algorithms to describe an aggregate signature scheme, as shown in Figure 3 .
Setup(n): Given security parameter n, the key generation center (KGC) provides necessary public parameters PP for all participants.
KeyExtract(n, PP): Given parameters n and PP, the KGC provides public/secret key pairs (pk, sk) for all single signers.
Sign(sk i , ): Given the i-th signer's secret key sk i and message to be signed, the i-th signer computes the signature e for message .
Verify(pk i , , e): Input the i-th signer's public key pk i and message-signature pair ( , e). If ( , e) satisfies some exact relations, output 1 and accept; otherwise, output 0 and reject.
Given t single message-signature pairs ( i , e i ) with associated public verification key pk i , i = 1, · · · , t, the aggregator computes the corresponding aggregate signature e a .
AggregateVerify(e a , pk i , i , i = 1, · · · , t): Input aggregate signature e a associated with public key pk i and message
satisfies some exact relations, output 1 and accept; otherwise, output 0 and reject.
B. SECURITY MODEL
According to Shen et al. [7] , the security of an aggregate signature scheme includes that of the utilized basic signature scheme and the aggregate algorithm. We describe these two aspects via two games.
1) SECURITY OF THE UTILIZED BASIC SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this part, the challenger C and the adversary A interact in the following game to describe the basic signature scheme's existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA).
Initialization: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system parameters PP and a single signer's public key pk i and secret key sk i . Then, it sends the PP and pk i to the adversary A while simultaneously keeping sk i secret.
Signing queries: The adversary A selects message and asks the challenger C for its signature under the public key pk i . C invokes algorithm Sign(sk i , ) to obtain the single message-signature pair ( , e) and then returns it to the adversary A. A repeats this step a polynomial number of times in his/her own manner.
Forgery:
When the adversary A obtains sufficient information, he/she gives t − 1 public key {pk j } j=1,··· ,t,j =i . Meanwhile, he provides t messages { 1 , 2 , · · · , t } without repetition. Then, adversary A generates an aggregate signature e a for message sequence ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) associated with corresponding public key sequence (pk 1 , pk 2 , · · · , pk t ).
If e a is a valid aggregate signature for message sequence ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) associated with corresponding public key sequence (pk 1 , pk 2 , · · · , pk t ), and if the single signature for message i associated with public key pk i has never been queried by the adversary A, then A wins the game.
Theorem 1: For every polynomial bounded adversary A, if the probability that he/she wins the above game is negligible, then the involved basic signature scheme in the aggregate signature scheme is EUF-CMA.
2) SECURITY OF THE AGGREGATE ALGORITHM
In this part, the security of the aggregate algorithm is described by the following game between the challenger C and the adversary A. Here, we assume that the involved basic signature scheme already achieves the security in Theorem 1.
Initialization: The challenger C executes the Setup algorithm to generate system parameters PP and then sends the PP to the adversary A.
Key queries: The adversary A selects the i-th signer and asks for his/her public/secret key pair from the challenger C. C runs algorithm KeyExtract(n, PP) to obtain (pk i , sk i ) and returns it to the adversary A.
AggregateVerify queries: The adversary A gives the challenger C an aggregate signature e a for message sequence ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) associated with corresponding public key sequence (pk 1 , pk 2 , · · · , pk t ). C invokes algorithm AggregateVerify(e a , pk i , i , i = 1, · · · , t) to determine the aggregate signature's validity and responds with either 1 (valid) or 0 (invalid) to A.
Forgery: When the adversary A obtains sufficient information and concludes the above queries, he/she gives his/her forged aggregate signature e * a for message sequence ( * 1 , * 2 , · · · , * t ) associated with public key sequence (pk 1 , pk 2 , · · · , pk t ).
If e * a is a valid aggregate signature for message sequence ( * 1 , * 2 , · · · , * t ) associated with public key sequence (pk 1 , pk 2 , · · · , pk t ), and if at least one single signature used to create e * a is invalid, then A wins the game. 
IV. A LATTICE-BASED UNORDERED AGGREGATE SIGNATURE SCHEME A. MAIN IDEA
The additive operation is a common polymerization method in traditional unordered aggregate signature schemes, such as [18] and [19] , but it is no longer useful for lattice-based unordered aggregate signatures. In lattice-based unordered aggregate signature schemes, we may obtain the sum of single signatures similarly, but we have not yet found an appropriate way to obtain the ''sum" of associated public keys to match the sum of the single signatures because of the special verification structure. With the help of a homomorphic signature, the existing schemes [11] and [12] follow the idea of the additive operation, which brings security risks to the schemes. Due to the special algebraic structure for verifying the equation, all single signatures must come from the same lattice with a trapdoor, requiring that all single signers have the trapdoor of a common lattice. Therefore, every single signer has the ability to compute other single signers' signatures, which cannot be allowed according to the requirement for signature unforgeability. Thus, to construct a lattice-based unordered aggregate signature, directly using the additive operation is no longer an option. Hence, we must determine how to aggregate lattice signatures associated with different lattices.
We focus on the peculiar property of lattice, using the intersection method to solve the above problem. The intersection method, introduced by Boneh and Freeman [13] in Eurocrypt 2011, can not only aggregate single signatures without the order and lattice limitation but also recover single signatures. Hence, verification of the aggregate signature can be transformed into verification of the single signatures.
In this way, we may take all single signatures (e 1 , · · · , e t ) from their individual lattices and then use the intersection method to assemble all single signatures into a short vector e, with e being the associated aggregate signature. To verify the aggregate signature e, we return e to (e 1 , · · · , e t ) and verify t relations simultaneously with the help of a collision-resistant hash function.
B. THE NEW SCHEME
Our new unordered aggregate signature scheme is composed of six algorithms, the details of which are as follows.
Setup(n):
The KGC prepares the following parameters. 1. q ≥ 3 is a polynomial of n, m = 6n log q , l = O( √ n log q). 2. t is the number of single signatures that will be aggregated. Gaussian parameters
4. Invoke trapdoor generation algorithm TrapGen(n, q, m) to obtain a uniform and random matrix A a ∈ Z n×m q and the short basis T a ∈ Z m×m for lattice ⊥ q (A a ), with T a ≤ l.
Compute t different lattices
Moreover, for lattice i , the shortest nonzero lattice vector length
KeyExtract(n):
Given the above parameters, the KGC provides t public/secret key pairs for t single signers.
For the i-th signer, the KGC invokes trapdoor generation algorithm TrapGen(n, q, m) to obtain a uniform and random matrix A i ∈ Z n×m q and the short basis T i ∈ Z m×m for lattice ⊥ q (A i ), with T i ≤ l. Then, the public verification key pk i = A i , and the secret signing key sk i = T i . Sign(sk i , i ): For the i-th signer with secret signing key sk i = T i and a message i ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer invokes algorithm SamplePre(A i , T i , H 1 ( i ), s i ) to obtain e i as his single signature for message i . Verify(pk i , i , e i ): For the i-th signer with public verification key pk i = A i , message-signature pair ( i , e i ) should satisfy
The aggregator completes the following steps to aggregate t single messagesignature pairs ( i , e i ) with associated public verification key
1. Construct equations:        e = e 1 mod 1 e = e 2 mod 2 · · · e = e t mod t (1) and compute the solution e.
2. Invoke algorithm SampleGaussian(T a , s a , −e) to obtain e 0 , and let e a = e 0 + e.
Finally, e a is the aggregate signature for message sequence ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) with associated public verification
AggregateVerify(e a , pk i , i , i = 1, · · · , t): For the aggregate signature e a associated with (pk i , i ), i = 1, · · · , t, if the following relations hold, the aggregate signature is valid.
Otherwise, the aggregate signature is invalid.
Remark: In the scheme construction, we assume that t single signatures need to be aggregated. If the actual number t 0 < t, we may take t − t 0 copies of redundant information to fill in the blanks; if the actual number t 0 > t, we may divide them into subgroups, with all subgroups executing the above operations. The solution to equations (1) is vector e. According to the intersection method, e is one-to-one correspondent to (e 1 , · · · , e t ), but e is not necessarily short. To make it shorter, we use algorithm SampleGaussian(T a , s a , −e) to obtain e 0 ; then, e a = e 0 + e is short enough such that e a ≤ s a √ m, with e a being in the same co-set as e. Thus, e a also satisfies equations (1) . That is, e a mod i = e i mod i , combining mod t ) mod q) .
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME
λ 1 ( i ) ≥ s i √ m and e i ≤ s i √ m, e a mod i = e i , i = 1, · · · , t. Thus, H 2 (H 1 ( 1 ), H 1 ( 2 ), · · · , H 1 ( t )) = H 2 (A 1 (e a mod 1 ) mod q, · · · , A t (e a
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
According to the security model definition, the security of our scheme has two aspects. First, the security of the utilized basic signature scheme is ensured by Theorem 4. Second, the security of the aggregate algorithm is obtained by Theorem 5.
Theorem 4: If the SIS problem is a hard problem, then our scheme has the basic signature scheme's EUF-CMA.
Proof: By contradiction, if adversary A has the ability to attack the basic signature scheme's EUF-CMA, the challenger C makes use of A and has the ability to obtain the solution to the SIS instance A ∈ Z n×m q .
Initialization:
The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the necessary system parameters. He/she sets a single signer's public key pk 1 = A and then sends the system parameters and pk 1 = A to the adversary A. Then, adversary A executes H 1 queries and signing queries with polynomial bounded times. For message , H 1 ( ) is always executed first. The challenger C should give reasonable answers.
H 1 queries: The challenger C maintains a list H 1 , the initial value of which is empty. When adversary A selects message , he/she asks the challenger C for the value of H 1 ( ). C obtains e 1 ←− D Z m ,s 1 , sets h 1 = Ae 1 mod q, saves ( , e 1 , h 1 ) in list H 1 , and returns h 1 to adversary A.
Signing queries:
The adversary A selects message and asks the challenger C for its signature under the public key pk 1 = A. C searches list H 1 for ( , e 1 , h 1 ) and returns e 1 to adversary A.
Forgery: When the adversary A obtains sufficient information, he/she runs algorithm TrapGen(n, q, m) to obtain (A 2 , T 2 ), · · · , (A t , T t ). Adversary A selects t messages { 1 , 2 , · · · , t } without repetition and makes the H 1 query on 1 . Then, adversary A generates a valid aggregate signature e a for message sequence ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) associated with corresponding public key sequence (A, A 2 , · · · , A t ) and sends the information to challenger C.
Challenger C looks up ( 1 , e 11 , h 11 ) in list H 1 and computes e 12 = e a mod 1 . If e 11 − e 12 = 0 and e 11 − e 12 is a short vector, then e 11 − e 12 is the solution to the SIS instance A.
We know that the adversary A has not made a signing query on message 1 and A has made the H 1 query on 1 , given h 11 = H 1 ( 1 ), according to the preimage minentropy property of the hash function ( [14] ), the min-entropy of e 12 is ω(log n). Therefore, with probability 1 − 2 −ω(log n) , e 11 − e 12 = 0.
Because for e 11 Proof: The proof has two directions. 1. Sufficiency We know that every single signature used in the aggregate algorithm is valid, namely, A i e i = H 1 ( i ) mod q and
Because e a is obtained from algorithm SampleGaussian (T a , s a , −e), and because e is the solution to equations (1), we obtain e a ≤ s a √ m and e a = e i mod i . For λ 1 ( i ) ≥ s i √ m, we have e a mod i = e i . Then,
Thus, the relations in the AggregateVerify algorithm are all established. Hence, the aggregate signature e a is valid.
2. Necessity Because the aggregate signature e a is valid, we let
e a mod 1 = e 1 e a mod 2 = e 2 · · · e a mod t = e t .
Due to
Because the aggregate signature e a is valid, we also have
Because H 2 is a collision-resistant hash function, we have
Hence, the relations in the Verify algorithm are all established, which indicates that each individual signature involved in the aggregate signature is valid.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Taking advantage of the intersection method for a lattice, we have proposed a lattice-based unordered aggregate signature scheme, which solves the problem in which signatures generated by different public keys are difficult to aggregate without order in a lattice. We realize scheme security from two aspects: security of the utilized basic signature scheme and security of the aggregate algorithm, and ensure that the aggregate signature is unforgeable and resistant to collusion attacks. Our scheme is suitable for wireless sensor networks and secure email systems, being able to protect message authentication during transmission even for quantum computers.
APPENDIX A CRYPTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF TWO LATTICE-BASED AGGREGATE SIGNATURE SCHEMES
In this part, we conduct a cryptographic analysis of two lattice-based aggregate signature schemes, describing the security defects in detail.
A. THE SCHEME IN [11] In 2012, Zhang et al. [11] proposed a homomorphic aggregate signature scheme based on a lattice, regarding which we here restate only its setup phase and signing phase.
Setup(n, l): n is the system security parameter, and l is the maximum user size. The security defect is as follows. The individual secret key for the i-th user is T i , but all instances of T i are the short bases of lattice ⊥ q (A). Therefore, the j-th user with T j has the ability to sign message u i in the name of the i-th user. The j-th user may carry out the following steps. (T j , B) to obtain short basis S j for lattice ⊥ q (B) such that S j = T j . 3. Invoke algorithm SamplePre(B, S j , u i , σ ) to obtain the signature e i .
Invoke SampleBasis
This e i also satisfies (A H (id))e i = u i mod q and e i ≤ σ √ 2m. The j-th user creates e i in the absence of the i-th user, which means that the j-th user can sign messages in the name of the i-th user. Naturally, the j-th user violates the i-th user's rights and interests, as demonstrated in Figure 1 .
B. THE SCHEME IN [12] In 2014, Jing [12] also proposed a homomorphic aggregate signature scheme based on a lattice. Its setup phase and signing phase are as follows. Notice that we simplify the signing operation.
Setup(n, l): n is the system security parameter, and l is the maximum user size.
1. Select suitable parameters q and m. 3. Define H : {0, 1} * −→ Z n q as a lattice-based homomorphic hash function.
Let
be the common public key, and deliver it to all users.
Sign(T i , u i ): for message u i ∈ Z m 2 : 1. Run algorithm SampleBasis(T i , A 0 ) to obtain short basis
This e i satisfies A 0 e i = h i mod q and e i ≤ σ √ lm. The key point of the above operations is the following: For every i ∈ {1, · · · , l}, by running algorithm SampleBasis(T i , A 0 ), we can obtain short basis S i for lattice ⊥ q (A 0 ). Therefore, even for the i-th user's message u i , the j-th user has the ability to give its signature without the i-th user's help. The j-th user may carry out the following steps.
1. Run algorithm SampleBasis(T j , A 0 ) to obtain short basis
This e i also satisfies A 0 e i = h i mod q and e i ≤ σ √ lm. The j-th user creates e i in the absence of the i-th user, which means that the j-th user can sign messages in the name of the i-th user. Naturally, the j-th user violates the i-th user's rights and interests, as exhibited in Figure 2 . Both scheme [11] and scheme [12] have the same defect: to complete the aggregation of signatures, all single signatures are associated with the same public key. Although every user has his/her own secret key, all these different secret keys lead to short bases for a common lattice. These short bases may be different, but they have the same ability: they can search for a short vector in some co-set of a common lattice. Given an arbitrary user, the functionality of his/her secret key is the same as that of all other users' secret keys; hence, he/she can take the place of all other users to obtain all individual signatures. Aggregating this signature set violates the original intention of the aggregate signature.
APPENDIX B PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS BETWEEN OUR SCHEME AND THE TWO LATTICE-BASED AGGREGATE SIGNATURE SCHEMES
In this part, we compare our scheme with two previously developed lattice-based unordered aggregate signature schemes: [11] and [12] . The compared items include the following: public key sizes, secret key sizes, aggregate signature sizes, sign computations, aggregate computations, aggregate verify computations and resistance to collusion attacks. The details are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 . We assume that t is the number of single signatures that will be aggregated in the three schemes. Because the basic parameters n, q, m are all determined by algorithm TrapGen in the three schemes, the three schemes have the same parameter settings. We compare the key sizes based on the number of basic elements and compare the algorithm computations based on the number of basic algorithms. For simplicity, we ignore simple calculations, such as the calculation of the hash function.
From Table 2 , we know that our scheme has small aggregate signature sizes, fewer sign computations, more aggregate and aggregate verify computations, and better security. 
